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AGENCY - DUTY TO EMPLOYER - UNFAIR COMPETITION
- EMPLOYEE DOES NOT BREACH FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
EMPLOYER BY MERE FAILURE TO DISCLOSE DETAILS' OF
PREPARATORY PLANS OF FUTURE COMPETITION. MARYLAND METALS, INC. u. METZNER, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564
(1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent case of Maryland Metals, Inc. u. Metzner,! which
involved an employee's privilege to plan and prepare for competition
with his employer before terminating his employment, signals a
shift in the Maryland court's focus when confronted with employeremployee disputes. The precise question addressed by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland was whether two employees breached their
common law fiduciary duties 2 to their employer by not revealing
details of their preparatory activities in establishing a competitive
business. 3 In a unanimous opinion written by the late Judge Irving
Levine, the court held that the employees' failure to disclose details
of preliminary arrangements for future competition prior to
terminating their employment did not constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty because there was no wrongful conduct independent
of the nondisclosure that detrimentally affected the employer's
business. 4
Frequently, an employee who desires to leave his employment
confronts the dilemma of choosing between his need to commence
plans for a change of employment prior to leaving his employer and
his possible breach of the duty of loyalty owed to his employer.
Although the law in Maryland has recognized an employee's
privilege to plan and prepare for future competition with his
employer prior to terminating his employment,5 the courts have not
1. 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978).
2. The fiduciary duties of an employee, as well as an agent, may arise from either of
two sources: a written contract or common law. An elaborate discussion of an
employee's common law duties to his employer is found in Trice v. Comstock, 121
F. 620 (8th Cir. 1903). The employees in Maryland Metals did not have a written
employment contract, therefore, the corporation alleged a breach of common law
fiduciary duties.
3. The employees preparatory activities were extensive. Brief for Appellant at 7-15,
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31,382 A.2d 564 (1978) (seventy-one
surreptitious events attributed to the employees while employed by Maryland
Metals).
4. 282 Md. at 48, 382 A.2d at 573. The employees in this case were high-level
managerial officers of Maryland Metals, Inc. Since the court declared that they
had no obligation to disclose details of their preparatory activities, a fortiori
lower-level employees would not be required to disclose similar activities.
5. Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 572, 217 A.2d
375, 388 (1966); C-E-I-R, Inc., v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 366, 183
A.2d 374, 379 (1962); Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592,
604-06, 119 A.2d 392, 398 (1956). Accord, United Aircraft Corp. v. Boreen, 413
F.2d 694, 700 (3d Cir. 1969); Keiser v. Walsh, 118 F.2d 13, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1941);
Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 346, 411 P.2d 921, 935, 49 Cal. Rptr.
825, 839 (1966).
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been successful in resolving this dilemma due to their imprecision in
defining the scope of the employee's privilege. 6 Maryland Metals
provides some assistance by delineating permissible and
impermissible employee conduct in preparing to compete with an
employer prior to terminating employment.
II. THE MARYLAND METALS SETTING
The Maryland Metals controversy developed as a result of rapid
technological advances in the design and manufacture of machinery
in the scrap metal business. 7 In 1966, Maryland Metals, Inc., a
processor of scrap metal, purchased a guillotine shears in order to
scrap junked automobiles. During the next seven years, the
corporation directed Sidney Metzner, the executive vice president,9 to
tour the country and evaluate a newer and more sophisticated
machine known as a shredder. 10 Metzner fully apprised the
corporation of the shredder's superior capabilities and continually
recommended its acquisition.
In September of 1970, Harry Kerstein, president of Maryland
Metals, II was authorized by the board of directors to purchase a
shredder from a leading manufacturer.l 2 Subsequently, Maryland
Metals entered into a cancelable contract with the manufacturer and
procured an option to buy land suitable for a shredding operation.

6. See, e.g., C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374
(1962). Judge Sybert, in C-E-I-R, indicated that "[t]here would appear to be no
precise line between acts by an employee which constitute mere preparation and
those which amount to solicitation. However indefinite that line may be, we feel
that the appellees crossed over the line into the area of solicitation forbidden to
the loyal employee." ld. at 367, 183 A.2d at 379. See generally Comment,
Permissible Employee Disloyalty and the Duane Jones Case, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.
278 (1954). See also Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 629 (D. Del.
1943), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945) (court acknowledged that
"[t]he doctrine of the fiduciary relation is one of the most confused and entangled
subjects in corporation law").
7. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 34, 382 A.2d 564, 566 (1978) (court
indicated that these developments "contributed significantly to the genesis" of
the case).
8. The guillotine shear was purchased for $400,000.00. The shear produced a No.2
grade scrap metal by shearing automobile hulks into slabs containing metal and
non-metal objects. ld. at 34 n.1, 382 A.2d at 566 n.1.
9. Metzner was appointed executive vice-president after twenty-three years of
service. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 34, 382 A.2d 564, 566
(1978).
10. A shredder produces a No.1, or premium, grade of scrap metal. Its output isa
purified scrap product because the machine is capable of segregating non-steel
from steel and non-metal from metal. ld. at 34 n.2, 382 A.2d at 566 n.2.
Furthermore, a shredder produces twice as much scrap tonnage per day as the
guillotine shear. Brief for Appellant at 5, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282
Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978).
11. Harry Kerstein founded the business and upon incorporation in 1955 became the
first president of the company and sole stockholder. ld. at 33, 382 A.2d at 566.
12. ld. at 35, 382 A.2d at 566.
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Because of unforeseen economic conditions and growing skepticism
concerning the efficiency of the shredder, the contract was rescinded
and the option was not exercised. I3
Harry Kerstein died in June 1973 and his son, Robert Kerstein,
succeeded him as president of Maryland Metals. Metzner, assisted
by a fellow executive, George Sellers,14 was told again to investigate
the economic feasibility of acquiring a shredder. Based on their
comprehensive study, Metzner and Sellers recommended to Kerstein
that Maryland Metals expand its business operations by purchasing
a shredder. When the corporation failed to take action, both
employees indicated an unwillingness to remain in the company's
employment as salaried employees. I5
In November 1973, Metzner met with Kerstein and demanded
that he be allowed to own equity in the corporation. After Kerstein
denied the request,I6 Metzner suggested that he, Sellers and Kerstein
form a new corporation with each individual owning a one-third
interest in the shredding operation. I7 Kerstein rejected the plan and
Metzner informed Kerstein that he and Sellers would purchase a
shredder and operate a business without his participation. 18
13. Id. at 35, 382 A.2d at 567.
14. Sellers was employed upon Metzner's recommendation in 1970. By 1974, Sellers
was vice-president in charge of operations. Id. at 34, 382 A.2d at 566.
15. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Conservit, Inc., No. 29, 472 Equity, slip op. at 3-4
(Wash. Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1976), aff'd, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978); Brieffor
Appellees at 23, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564
(1978).
16. When Harry Kerstein died, he left all the Maryland Metals stock in a
testamentary trust. 282 Md. at 36, 382 A.2d at 567. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. § 4-412 (1974) (legacy to testamentary trust). Since the stock was tied up in
the trust, Robert Kerstein was unable to distribute any of it.
17. 282 Md. at 36, 382 A.2d at 567.
18. Id. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Metzner informed Kerstein
that he and Sellers would set up an operation to compete with Maryland Metals.
The Chancellor, Judge Rutledge, sitting in the Circuit Court for Washington
County without a jury, found that the employees had notified Kerstein that if he
or Maryland Metals was not willing to participate in the proposed shredding
operation, they would enter into business for themselves with or without
Kerstein.ld. at 41,382 A.2d at 570. Maryland Metals, however, denied receiving
such notification. Id. at 42 n.4, 382 A.2d at 570 n.4. The court of appeals
considered the evidence in a light most favorable to Metzner and Sellers, and
declined to disturb the Chancellor's findings because they were not clearly
erroneous under Md. Rule 886 (1978) (appellate review by court of appeals of
action tried by lower court without jury). Id. at 41, 382 A.2d at 570.
A major factor in the lower court's decision was the credibility of the
employees, whose fidelity, loyalty and honesty were in question. The Chancellor,
however, did not have the opportunity of observing and hearing an examination
of Sellers at trial because large portions of his deposition were read into evidence,
despite the fact that Sellers was present in the courtroom. Brief for Appellant at
44, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978). An
important procedural ruling made by the Court of Appeals of Maryland was that
Md. Rule 413(a)(4) (1978) allows the trial judge broad discretion in deciding when
and for what purpose a deposition may be read into evidence after a portion of
the deposition has been introduced by an adverse party. 282 Md. at 49, 382 A.2d
at 574.
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Thereafter, Metzner and Sellers commenced a series of activities that
led to the establishment of an independent shredding operation. 19
The new operation opened for business in March of 1975, nine
months after Metzner and Sellers had terminated their employment
with Maryland Metals. 20 From the time the employees first disclosed
their general plans to form an independent business until
termination of their employment, they continued to work long hours
and devote considerable efforts on behalf of Maryland Metals. 21
Shortly after Metzner and Sellers's new shredding business
opened, Maryland Metals sought to enjoin the operation of the rival
scrap metal business and claimed damages against Metzner and
Sellers for breach of fiduciary duties. 22 The trial court denied relief,
ruling that the employees' preparatory activities did not constitute
wrongful behavior.23 Maryland Metals appealed and the court of
appeals granted certiorari. 24
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S
HOLDING
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling that
Maryland law does not require an employee to disclose in detail his
preparatory activities to enter into competition with his employer
unless some other act, beyond mere nondisclosure, is inimical to the
employer's business.

19. A chronological summary of the employees' activities is as follows:
December 1973 - Employees formed Delaware corporation, which
qualified to do business in Maryland, and contacted the electric company
regarding power requirements for the shredding operation.
January 1974 - Employees applied for loan to purchase shredder.
This loan was consummated in August 1974.
February 1974 - Employees obtained an option on land and
executed a sales agreement for the shredder.
May 1974 - Sellers was discharged by Maryland Metals and
Metzner resigned, but continued working until June 1974.
July 1974 - Employees formed new Maryland corporation for the
shredder business.
March 1975 - Competitive shredder business opened.
ld. at 42-43. 382 A.2d at 570-71.
20. There is no doubt that if the employees had opened their competitive business
before they terminated their employment with Maryland Metals, they would
have been found in breach of their fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Ritterpusch v.
Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 602 A.2d 392, 397 (1956). See also
Aero Drapery of Ky., Inc. v. Engdahl. 507 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1974).
21. The fiscal year ending in 1974, the last year Metzner and Sellers worked for
Maryland Metals, was the best year in the corporation's history. Brief for
Appellees at 9-10, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564
(1978).
22. 282 Md. at 33, 382 A.2d at 566.
23.ld.
24. ld. The court of appeals granted certiorari in advance of oral arguments in the
court of special appeals pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-203
(1974).
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The court was mindful of two important public policies in this
area of the law. 25 On the one hand, courts have required undivided
employee loyalty in order to protect an employer's proprietary
interest in his business from unfair competition. 26 There is also an
equally strong policy that favors "free and vigorous competition in
the economic sphere."27 An important aspect of vigorous competition
is the legal right of an individual to choose his own employment. 28
Since every person has a right to improve his own socio-economic
status, his "spirit of enterprise [should not be] unduly hampered."29
Employees are not precluded, by virtue of their employment
relationship, from exercising their legal right to enter into
competition against a former employer provided the employee's

25. The court indicated that in balancing an employee's right to enter into
competition with his employer against the countervailing right of an employer to
restrain his agent's competitive endeavors, the law seeks to harmonize two
important policies. The first is that "commercial competition must be conducted
according to basic rules of honesty and fair dealing . . . . The second policy
recognized by the courts is that of safeguarding society's interest in fostering free
and vigorous competition in the economic sphere." 282 Md. at 37-38,382 A.2d at
568.
26. ld. See Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 575,
217 A.2d 375, 389 (1966); Comment, The Obligation of a High-Level Employee to
His Former Employer: The Standard Brands Case, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 351
(1962).
27. 282 Md. at 37-38, 382 A.2d at 568.
28. Id. at 39, 382 A.2d at 569; Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Turner, 30 N.C. App.
686,691-92,228 S.E.2d 478, 483 (1976); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 578,160
A.2d 430, 434 (1960).
The Supreme Court has not decided whether an individual has a constitutional right to work. Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (when faced
with a constitutional challenge of a state statute that excluded Medicaid
payments for certain abortions by two licensed physicians, Court declined to
decide whether' the doctors had a constitutional right to practice medicine). In
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), however, Justice Stevens quoted
with approval the language of Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915): "It requires no
argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations
of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity
that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure . . . . " 426 U.S.
at 102-03 n.23. See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954)
(Douglas, J., dissenting):
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that
man possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live,
to be free, to own property. The American ideal was stated by Emerson
in his essay on Politics, "A man has a right to be employed, to be trusted,
to be loved, to be revered." It does many men little good to stay alive and
free and propertied, if they cannot work. To work means to eat. It also
means to live. For many it would be better to work in jail, than to sit idle
on the curb. The great values of freedom are in the opportunities afforded
man to press to new horizons, to pit his strength against the forces of
nature, to match skills with his fellow man.
Id. at 472.
29. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39, 38lfA.2cC564, 568-69 (1978)
(quoting Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 575,
217 A.2d 375, 389 (1966».
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conduct does not constitute an unfair competitive practice. 30
Furthermore, the right of an employee to economic advancement
includes a legal privilege to plan and prepare to compete with an
employer prior to terminating employment. 31 The law has recognized
that an employee "need not wait until he is on the street before he
looks for other work. He may plan and prepare, during the agency, to
engage in a business after it ceases."32
In Maryland Metals, the court used a balancing test to reconcile
and harmonize the two competing policies. The court began its
reasoning by acknowledging that an employee owes a duty of
loyalty and fidelity to his employer,33 balanced with the legal
privilege of an employee to plan and prepare to compete with his
employer prior to ending his employment. 34 It noted, however, that
the privilege is not absolute and can be extinguished by serious
misconduct. 35 The court reasoned that to require an employee to
disclose the precise nature of competitive plans to his employer
before terminating his employment would have a chilling effect upon
the employee's right to compete and thereby stifle free enterprise. 36
Thus, the court declared, if the privilege is to have any effect, it must
be capable of exercise without the necessity of revealing the details
of preparatory plans to the employer. 37 An employee's liability for
breach of fiduciary duty is not predicated on mere failure to disclose

30. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978). See
Group Ass'n Plans, Inc. v. Colquhoun, 466 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The "duty to
a former employer, and the doctrine of freedom to compete absent contractual
duties to the contrary, are not mutually inconsistent." Id. at 474.
31. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978);
Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 572, 217 A.2d
375, 388 (1966); C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 366, 183
A.2d 374, 379 (1962); Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592,
602, 119 A.2d 392, 396-97 (1956).
32. Keiser v. Walsh, 118 F.2d 13, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See Meyers v. Roger J. Sullivan
Co., 166 Mich. 193, 131 N.W. 521 (1911). "A servant may not, while engaged in
the service of his master, 'injure his trade, or undermine his business; but every
one has a right if he can to better his situation in the world, and if he does it by
means not contrary to law, though the master may be eventually injured, it is
damnum absque injuria.'" Id. at 195, 131 N.W. at 523.
33. E.g., De Crette v. Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 115, 127 A. 639, 642 (1925); Cumberland
Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 581, 605 (1875); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
458, 464-65, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). Public policy demands that corporate
officers and directors scrupulously observe their fiduciary duties of diligence,
obedience, fidelity and honesty. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 235 (2d
ed. 1970). The standard of care required of directors is statutorily set forth under
Maryland law. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.1 (1976). See also Miller,
The Fiduciary Duties of a Corporate Director, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 259 (1975).
34. 282 Md. 31, 39, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978).
35. Id. at 40, 382 A.2d at 569.
36. Id. at 47-48, 382 A.2d at 573.
37. Id. Accord, National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 26-27 (Mo. 1966);
see Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 413 (3d Cir. 1961).
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such preparatory acts, but rather upon some particular circumstance
that renders nondisclosure injurious to the employer's business. 3s
The leading Maryland case illustrating unreasonable conduct
and unfair competition is C-E-I-R, Inc. u. Computer Dynamics
Corp.39 In that case, C-E-I-R sought injunctive relief and monetary
damages against former loyal employees and a competing business
formed by them. The evidence revealed that the employees engaged
in unfair competition and breached their fiduciary duties by
soliciting the employer's customers, luring key personnel to the new
competitor, diverting corporate opportunities to themselves, and
acquiring information of a unique nature in violation of their written
agreements. 40 Under these circumstances, the court of appeals held
that the employees breached their fiduciary duties because the
activities were detrimental to the employer's business. 41
Relying on C-E-I-R, the main contention of Maryland Metals
was that the failure of its high-echelon employees to disclose their
numerous surreptitious acts 42 constituted a breach of their fiduciary

38. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 42 n.4, 382 A.2d 564, 570 n.4 (1978);
Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 346-47, 411 P.2d 921, 935-36, 49
Cal. Rptr. 825, 839-40 (1966).
While no precise line between proper and improper conduct of an employee
regarding preparation for future competition has been established .in Maryland,
certain limits of proper and improper conduct have been recognized~ Instances of
proper conduct include: (1) purchase of a rival business, C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer
Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 366, 183 A.2d 374, 379 (1962); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 393, Comment e (1958); (2) immediate competition upon
termination of employment, Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208
Md. 592, 602, 119 A.2d 392, 397 (1956); (3) advising customers of proposed
termination of employment, Id. at 600, 119 A.2d at 396; and (4) making
arrangements to compete after termination. Id. at 602, 119 A.2d at 397.
Examples of improper conduct include: (1) appropriation of trade secrets,
Space Aero Products Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 113-14,208 A.2d 74, 84,
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); (2) use of confidential information, C-E-I-R, Inc.
v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 368, 183 A.2d 374, 380 (1962); (3)
conspiracy to injure the employer's business, Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y.
172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954); (4) solicitation of employer's customers prior to
cessation of employment, Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc.,
241 Md. 550, 217 A.2d 375 (1966); C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229
Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962); (5) usurpation of employer's business opportunities,
Standard Brands, Inc. v. United States Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F.
Supp. 161 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Comment, The Obligation of a High-Level Employee
to his Former Employer: The Standard Brands Case, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 339
(1962); and (6) solicitation of employer's key employees, C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer
Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962).
39. 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962).
40. Id. at 365, 183 A.2d at 378-79. In C-E-I-R, unlike Maryland Metals, confidential
information was used by the employees, and more importantly the employees
breached a written employment agreement not to reveal such information. Id. at
368, 183 A.2d at 380.
41. Id. at 367-68, 183 A.2d at 379-80.
42. See notes 3 & 9 supra.
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duties of loyalty and fidelity.43 Maryland Metals claimed that
Metzner and Sellers began preparations for the establishment of a
competing business while still employed by Maryland Metals and
that they failed to communicate their detailed activities to the
corporation as required by law. 44 When faced with such a contention,
other courts have examined "the point of separation from the
corporation in relation to the spectrum from fiduciary duties on the
one end to active competition on the other."45 Similarly, courts will
investigate the employee's behavior in relationship with the
employer to determine whether it is reasonable and fair under the
circumstances. 46
The task of the court of appeals in Maryland Metals was to
scrutinize the particular circumstances of the employees'
preparatory arrangements to determine whether they were injurious
and detrimental to the corporation. Unlike the employees in C-E-I-R,
Metzner and Sellers did not misuse unique and confidential
information regarding their employer's business. 47 Since
information readily available to the public or individuals in the
industry may be utilized by a former employee,48 the mere fact that
Metzner and Sellers learned about the shredder's value and its
availability while acting in a fiduciary capacity to the corporation
did not preclude them from acquiring the shredder for themselves. 49

43. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Conservit, Inc., No. 29, 472 Equity, slip op. at 1 (Wash.
Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1976), afl'd, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978); Brief for
Appellant at 20, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564
(1978).
44. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Conservit, Inc., No. 29, 472 Equity, slip op. at 1-2
(Wash. Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1976), afl'd, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978); Brieffor
Appellees at 13, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564
(1978).
.
45. Jacobs, Business Ethics and the Law: Obligations of a Corporate Executive, 28
THE BUSINESS LAWYER 1063, 1076-77 (1973).
46. See Comment, The Obligation of a High·Level Employee to His Former
Employer: The Standard Brands Case, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 350 (1962).
47. Although the trial court found that Metzner and Sellers did not appropriate
confidential information from Maryland Metals, the corporation suggested in its
brief that the employees engaged in innumerable meetings and had numerous
items of correspondence, much of it on company time and at company expense,
and were "feathering their nests" by setting up their business while drawing
large salaries from the company. Brief for Appellant at 28, Maryland Metals,
Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978). Metzner and Sellers, however,
contended that all information acquired by them regarding the scrap processing
business was readily available to the general public in trade and government
publications. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Conservit, Inc., No. 29, 472 Equity, slip op.
at 4 (Wash. Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1976), afl'd, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978); Brief
for Appellees at 16, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564
(1978).
48. See, e.g., National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polyner Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732,
737-38, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357, 362 (1948).
49. See, e.g., Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 313-14, 49 P.2d 429,
431 (1935).
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The case is further distinguishable from C-E-I-R in that Metzner and
Sellers's actions in acquiring land and purchasing a shredder did
not deprive their former employer of any corporate opportunity. 50
The corporation consistently rejected Metzner and Sellers's
recommendations that Maryland Metals acquire a shredder. 51 The
rejection of a corporate opportunity by a disinterested majority of the
directors bars any challenge to subsequent exploitation of the
situation by the fiduciary, 52 for "where the principal repudiates the
transaction, the agent is free to act for himself."53 Nor did Metzner
and Sellers appropriate trade secrets, 54 solicit customers, 55 or recruit

50. Whether an employee has usurped a corporate opportunity depends upon which
of the three tests the court uses in its deliberations: "expectancy," "line of
business," or the "fairness" test. The "expectancy" test relies on whether the
corporation realistically expects to seize and develop the opportunity. If the
expectation is tangible, the corporate fiduciary may not appropriate it and
thereby frustrate the corporate purpose. Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967);
Abbott Redmont Thinlite Corp., v. Redmont, 324 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 475 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1973); Lagarde v. Anniston Lime
& Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900); American Window Cleaning Co. v.
Cohen, 343 Mass. 195, 178 N.E.2d 5 (1961); Lincoln Stores, Inc., v. Grant, 309
Mass. 417,34 N.E.2d 704 (1941); Washer v. Seager, 272 App. Div. 297, 71 N.Y.S.2d
46 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 918, 79 N.E.2d 745 (1948). See also Comment, The
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 18 Sw. L. J. 96 (1964).
The "line of business" test focuses on whether the opportunity the employee
develops is materially related to an existing or prospective activity of the
corporation. It is narrower than the "expectancy" test, and only requires a
cursory examination of the context in which the opportunity arises. Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222
N.W.2d 71 (1974); Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REV. 765 (1961).
The "fairness" test is an application of ethical principals to the situation.
The court will look at all relevant facts and circumstances existing at the time
the opportunity is appropriated. This test is least concerned with stated corporate
purposes, emphasizing instead the concept of competitive fairness. Raines v.
Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 313 S.W.2d 802 (1958); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.8.2d 667
(Sup. Ct. 1940). See generally Comment, Liability of Directors and Other Officers
for Usurpation of Corporate Opportunities, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 528 (1957).
51. 282 Md. 31, 35, 382 A.2d 564, 566-67 (1978).
52. Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REV. 765, 774 (1961).
53. Note, Fiduciary Duty of Officers and Directors Not to Compete with the
Corporation, 54 HARv L. REv. 1191, 1192 (1941) (footnote omitted). "If a
corporation has actually determined not to engage in the line of business
involved in the opportunity, [or has previously rejected the opportunity,] a
director or officer may take advantage of its availability to him." W. KNEPPER,
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 3.03, at 54 (2d ed. 1973)
(footnote omitted).
54. "A'trade secret consists of any valuable formula, pattern, device, process or other
information that is used in one's business and gives the possessor a competitive
advantage over those who do not know or use the information." Kubik, Inc. v.
Hull, 56 Mich. App. 335, 347, 224 N.W.2d 80, 87 (1974). C{. Space Aero Products
Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965)
(court of appeals held plaintiffs "know how" in the manufacture of oxygen
breathing hoses was a trade secret).
55. Solicitation would clearly be a violation of fiduciary duty in Maryland.
Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 119 A.2d 392 (1956). In
Ritterpusch, the court of appeals upheld a lower·court's jury instruction which it
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other key employees 56 prior to terminating their employment.
Rather, Metzner and Sellers displayed good faith and fidelity to
Maryland Metals during the full term of their employment. 57 The
employees' recommendation to expand the business by buying a new
shredder was designed to benefit the company. Indeed, even after
submitting his resignation, Metzner negotiated a very profitable
contract for the benefit of Maryland Metals. 58
After closely scrutinizing Metzner and Sellers's activities, the
court was unable to find any breach of fiduciary duties. 59 In sum, the
corporation failed to prove that the employees engaged in any
conduct, beyond the mere failure to disclose details, which
detrimentally affected Maryland Metals's business. so
IV. EVOLUTION OF LAW: AN EMPLOYEE'S PRIVILEGE TO
MAKE PLANS FOR COMPETITION BEFORE
TERMINATING HIS EMPLOYMENT
The result declared in Maryland Metals represents a stage in the
gradual evolution away from traditional agency law, which severely
curtailed an employee's independence, toward more practical rules in
light of the realities of the modern employment relationship.61
characterized as stating that an employee "may not go as far as to solicit the
business or customers of his employer before the termination of his employment." Id. at 595, 119 A.2d at 393.
56. See C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962);
Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954).
57. It is important to note that in March of 1974, only three months prior to his
resignation, the Board of Directors passed a resolution awarding Metzner a
bonus of $40,000.00 in recognition of his dedicated and skillful work. Brief for
Appellees at 11, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564
(1978). See also note 21 and accompanying text supra.
58.' 282 Md. 31, 44, 382 A.2d 564, 571 (1978).
59. Id. at 48, 382 A.2d at 573.
60. Id. Unlike the present case, a majority of past cases involving employment
disputes have held in favor of the employer on grounds of the employee's abuse
of his fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F.2d 236 (N.D.
Cal. 1931) (operating competing company while president of plaintiff corporation); Hall v. Dekker, 45 Cal. App. 2d 783, 115 P.2d 15 (1941) (organizing
competing business while secretary-treasurer of plaintiff); C·E-I-R, Inc., v.
Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962); Ritterpusch v.
Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 119 A.2d 392 (1956); Duane Jones Co.
v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954). But see, e.g., Computer Sciences
Corp. v. Ferguson, 74 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 1968) (court found employee's
preparatory arrangements did not injure employer since employee did not solicit
other employees or customers of his employer, nor disclose trade secrets or use
confidential information).
61. See Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate
and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1 (1976). "[T]he rigid standard of undivided
loyalty has given way to a more flexible norm, as courts have come to take a
more pragmatic view of business practices." Id. at 51 (citing United Founders
Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971);
Shlenshy v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960);
Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643,256 N.Y.S.2d 607
(1965».
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The employee-employer relationship has been governed in the
past by strict agency principles. 62 Traditionally, an employee has
been required to avoid placing himself in a position where his
interests might conflict with those of his employer63 and has been
held liable for the slightest deviation from his fiduciary duties. 64 In
every employment contract, whether written or oral, courts have
found an implied obligation on the part of the employee to serve his
employer diligently and faithfully,65 to perform the employment
duties honestly,66 to use his best efforts for the benefit of the

62. Historically, the conflicts between an employer and a former employee who hOas
become a competitor can be traced back to the sixteenth century when
employment was carried on chiefly through the guild system, in which the
apprentice, following a long period of training, was free to practice his trade even
in competition with the master who had instructed him. As apprentices' terms of
service expired, masters tried to require that apprentices could not carry out their
occupation as "freemen" without their master's consent. Thus, the Act for
Avoiding of Exactions Taken Upon Apprentices was passed in 1536. 28 Hen. 8,
ch. 5. That statute prohibited masters from compelling apprentices to take an
oath not to set up or keep any shop nor receive money "for or concerning his or
their freedom or occupation . . . . " Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete,
73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 634 (1960).
Long before the rise of the corporation as a dominant form of modem
business, the law imposed upon the employee a duty of loyalty.
The duty of loyalty, as applied to business activities engaged in by one
in the position of employee, is the duty of so disciplining one's
acquisitive impulses that they will operate vicariously so as to increase
to the maximum extent possible not one's own acquisitions but those of
one's employer.
Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of The Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers
Practicable? 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 195 (1935).
63. E.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939) (corporate officer); De
Crette v. Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 115, 127 A. 639, 642 (1925) (agent); Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-65, 164 N.E. 545, 546-47 (1928) (joint venturer).
64. Disputes of this nature are heard in equity and the remedies may be any or all of
the following. An injunction or restraining order may be issued when such
judicial action may prevent employer injury. See, e.g., United Board & Carton
Corp. v. Britting, 63 N.J. Super. 517, 164 A.2d 824 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 61 N.J.
Super. 340, 160 A.2d 660, cert. denied, 33 N.J. 326, 164 A.2d 379 (1960) (court
restrained salesmen who used employer's confidential price list from competing
for two years). Damages may be awarded by the equity court's ancillary
jurisdiction for subsequent injuries resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty.
Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954) (plaintiff granted
$300,000 damages for loss of clients caused by improper employee solicitation).
An accounting may be ordered to compensate employer for losses suffered. Nagel
v. Todd, 185 Md. 512, 45 A.2d 326 (1946) (agent negotiated lower purchase price
and kept the difference). A court may impose a constructive trust with the
corporation as the beneficiary of all earnings. Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48
F.2d 236 (N.D. Cal. 1931) (director of the plaintiff corporation required to submit
to an accounting for profits earned by a competing cab company incorporated by
the director while serving as plaintiff's director).
65. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 38, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (1978). See
also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
66. See Stuber v. Taylor, 200 N.W.2d 276, 280 (N.D. 1972) (agent has duty to "deal
fairly with the principal in all transactions between them."); cf. Maryland Credit
v. Hagerty, 216 Md. 83, 90, 139 A.2d 230, 233 (1958) (employee has duty to refrain
from deception).
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employer,67 and to refrain from any acts injurious to his employer's
interests. 68 The common law maxim, "no man can serve two
masters," has been articulated by numerous courtS. 69 Moreover,
many courts have recognized Justice Cardozo's classic statement in
Meinhard v. Salmon: 70
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, (sic) are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most' sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been, the attitude of courts of
equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular
exceptions. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct of
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by
the crowd. 71
The first Maryland case to discuss an employee's privilege to
plan to compete before terminating his employment was Ritterpusch
v. Lithographic Plate Service, Inc. 72 The court stated in dicta that an
employee has a legal right, while still employed, to make
preparations to compete with his employer before terminating his
employment. 73 The employees in Ritterpusch, however, were held to
be in violation of their fiduciary duties because their actions of
soliciting employer's customers before terminating their employment
went beyond the scope of the privilege. 74
C·E·I-R75 was the next Maryland case to acknowledge the
employee's privilege. The court again ruled in favor of the employer's
vested property interests and held that the employees' solicitation
went beyond the scope of the privilege. 76 Ambiguous overtones
67. C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 366, 183 A.2d 374, 379
.
(1962).
68. Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 600, 119 A.2d 392,
395-96 (1956).
69. E.g., Aero Drapery of Ky., Inc. v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1974); De
Crette v. Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 115, 127 A. 639, 642 (1925). A borrowed employee,
however, may become the servant of the transferee. Compare Charles v. Barrett,
233 N.Y. 127, 135 N.E. 199 (1922) (so long as the employee is furthering his
employer's business, there is no change of masters), with Gordon v. S.M. Byers
Motor Car Co., 309 Pa. 453, 164 A. 334 (1932) (borrowed servant found to be
promoting the interests of two masters).
70. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
71. Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
72. 208 Md. 592, 119 A.2d 392 (1956).
73. Id. at 602, 119 A.2d at 397.
74. Id. at 595, 119 A.2d at 393.
75. 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962).
76. Id. at 367, 183 A.2d at 379.

1979)

Maryland Metals Inc. v. Metzner

371

regarding disclosure were made by the court in an effort to safeguard
proprietary interests of an employer against the employee's
privilege. The court declared in seemingly contradictory dicta:
We do not intimate that in all cases an employee must tell
his employer of his future plans to become a competitor.
However, the rule is well established that an agent is under
a duty' to disclose to his employer any information
concerning the agency which the employer would be likely to
want to know. 77

It was not until sixteen years later in Maryland Metals that the
court clarified and refined the C-E-J-R dicta by declaring that to
require disclosure of preparatory details would negate the employee's
privilege. 7R Maryland Metals is the first Maryland case to hold in
favor of the employee's privilege when confronted with the dilemma
of an employee competing against a former employer. 79 Thus, the
present state of the law in Maryland is that an employee's failure to
disclose details of his preparation for competition is not a breach of
fiduciary duties unless some other conduct, apart from nondisclosure, is injurious to the employer's business. so
An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions are in general accord
'with Maryland's view that an employee has a legal privilege to
co~mence preparatory activities for future competition against his
employer, before terminating his employment. S ! There has been
77, Id. at 367, 183 A.2d at 379-80.
78, 282 Md. 31, 47, 382 A.2d 564, 573 (1978).
79. Maryland Metals is significant because it is' the first Maryland case in which
employees prevailed in an employment dispute on the basis of their privilege to
prepare to compete prior to ending their employment. In an earlier Maryland
case, Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 217
A.2d 375 (1966), employees prevailed in an employment dispute but not on the
basis of their privilege. In Operations Research, former employees and a
corporation organized by them after terminating their employment were sued by
the former corporate employer for breach of duties. Operations Research, Inc.
alleged that two employees breached their duties by wrongfully recruiting key
employees, using confidential information in the nature of trade secrets and
diverting corporate opportunities after they resigned. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the'bill of complaint on the basis that the
corporation failed to prove that the employees breached their duties before
resigning, Although the court acknowledged that an employee has a privilege
before terminating employment to make arrangements to compete, the em·
ployee's privilege was not the basis of the court's decision because the record
failed to show any preparatory arrangements by the employees before leaving
their employment. Id. at 572, 217 A.2d ~t 388.
80. 282 Md. at 42 n.4, 382 A.2d at 570 n.4.
81. See, e.g., Bancroft·Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 411 P.2d 921, 49 Cal. Rptr.
825 (1966). The court, in Bancroft, focused on a corporate officer's conduct and
found that he had breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to his employer by
aiding a competitor in the solicitation of corporate employees. The court
enunciated the principle that an employee is not required to disclose his
preparatory arrangements in every situation but only when the preparations
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disagreement, however, on the extent of disclosure required by an
employee concerning his competitive plans while employed. Several
courts have required full disclosure of preparatory activities,82 while
others have declared that there is no requirement to disclose any
plans or preparations. 1l3
In Maryland Metals, the court of appeals was bound by the
lower court's finding of fact that the employees informed Maryland
Metals of their general intention to compete. 84 Therefore, the court
neglected to address expressly the question of whether disclosure of
a general intention to compete, as distinguished from disclosure of
specific acts of preparation, is required by law. If the court were
confronted with the issue in the near future, it would most likely
favor the employee's privilege and declare that an employee need not
disclose his intentions to compete. This conclusion is supported by
dicta in Maryland Metals, in which the court indicated that even a
complete failure to disclose an intention to compete would not have
constituted a breach of the employees' fiduciary duty.85 Consequently, the court of appeals seems to have joined, by way of dicta,
the growing minority of jurisdictions that do not require an
employee to disclose any intention to compete because such a
requirement inhibits an employee's privilege to prepare.

82.

83.

84.
85.

render nondisclosure harmful to the employer. Accord, Cudahy Co. v. American
Laboratories, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Neb. 1970); Colon ell v. Goodman, 78 F.
Supp. 845 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 169 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
870 (1948); United Board & Carton Corp. v. Britting, 63 N.J. Super. 517,164 A.2d
824 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 61 N.J. Super. 340,160 A.2d 660, cert. denied, 33 N.J.
326, 164 A.2d 379 (1960).
E.g., Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952); Standard
Brands, Inc. v. United States Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161
(E.D. Wis. 1961); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Pratt, 22 F. Supp. 304 (D. Kan. 1938);
Societa Operaia Di Mutuo Soccorso Villalba v. Di Maria, 40 N.J. Super. 344, 122
A.2d 897 (1956); Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 210 (1950);
Faultersack v. Clintonville Sales Corp., 253 Wis. 432, 34 N.W.2d 682 (1948).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §393 Comment e (1958) supports an
employee's right to prepare to compete with his employer before termination, but
the RESTATEMENT does not state the employee's corollary right to make such
preparations without the necessity of revealing such plans to his employer. Brief
for Appellees at 19, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564
(1978).
See Metal Lubricants Co. v. Engineered Lubricants Co., 411 F.2d 426, 428-30 (8th
Cir. 1969); Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp.
1173, 1181-82 (D. Ariz. 1973); Thau·Nolde, Inc. v. Krause Dental Supply & Gold
Co., 518 S.W.2d 5, 9-10 (Mo. 1974); National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409
S.W.2d 1, 26 (Mo. 1966).
See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
"[Maryland Metals] denies that [Metzner and Sellers] ever notified it of their
intention to establish a competing enterprise ... As we see it, however, the
giving of the contested notice in this case is not dispositive of the breach of
fiduciary duty question." Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 42 n.4,
382 A.2d 564, 570 n.4 (1978) (emphasis added).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF MARYLAND METALS
Maryland Metals represents a shift in the court's focus when
deciding employment disputes. The court initially will consider the
individual employee's right to work and privilege to prepare to
compete, and then take into account the employer's interests to
determine whether the employee's conduct has been injurious to the
employer's business. Before Maryland Metals, the court first
considered the employer's right to protect his business against
ambitious employees, and then examined the employee's privilege.
Thus, under the pre-Maryland Metals approach; courts generally
favored an employer's property interests over an employee's
privilege to prepare for a change of employment. 86 The court's shift
in focus after Maryland Metals will likely result, however, in more
decisions favoring employees when a court is confronted with
employment disputes similar to the one in Maryland Metals. H7
Employers should not interpret Maryland Metals as an unwillingness by the court to protect an employer's legitimate proprietary
interests,88 but should recognize it as a signal "employers beware"89
of competitive employees. While the court of appeals indicated that a
covenant not to compete might have avoided the entire problem for
the corporation,90 it is not at all clear whether a post-employment

86. See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 299 A.2d 835 (1973); C·E·I·R, Inc. v. Computer
Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 257, 183 A.2d 374 (1962); Maryland Credit Fin. Corp. v.
Hagerty, 216 Md. 83, 139 A.2d 230 (1958); Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv.,
Inc., 208 Md. 592, 119 A.2d 392 (1956); De Crette v. Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 127 A.
639 (1925); Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598 (1875). But see
Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 217 A.2d 375
(1966); note 82 supra.
87. A trend favoring employees in employment disputes can be discerned by
examining cases in jurisdictions other than Maryland. In California, courts have
decided in favor of employees on various occasions. E.g., Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen,
260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 255,67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 26 (1968) (employer failed to show any
evidence that the employees misappropriated trade secrets or used unfair tactics
in soliciting the corporation's employees and court deemed employee's interests
to be superior to corporation's interests). Knudsen Corp. v. Ever·Fresh Foods,
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 241, 245 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The court in Knudsen denied an
employer's application for preliminary injunction against ex-employees because
there was no showing of illegal conduct by them. The court observed that in the
absence of wrongful behavior, an employee's right to seek better employment
prevails over the business interests of his employer. Computer Sciences Corp. v.
Ferguson, 74 Cal. Rptr. 86,93 (Ct. App. 1968) (court ruled in favor of employee
since his preparatory conduct resulted in no loss or detriment to his employer).
88. Property rights that the employer may protect include trade secrets, confidential
information, corporate opportunities, and contractual relations with others. See,
e.g., Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 234 Ind. 398, 410-11,127 N.E.2d 235, 240
(1955); Newman, Formation of Competing Enterprise by Corporate Fiduciary, 3
Hous. L. REV. 221, 230-31 (1965).
89. Caveat patronus. D. P. SIMPSON, CASSELL'S NEW LATIN DICTIONARY, 96, 427
(1960).
90. 282 Md. 31, 48, 382 A.2d 564, 574 (1978).
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noncompetition covenant91 would have changed the result in
Maryland Metals. 92
Neither should Maryland Metals be misinterpreted by employees
who seek to compete with their employers. Maryland Metals does not
recognize an unfettered right in favor of an employee to commence
preparatory activities while employed. 93 The court declared that an
employee need not disclose preparatory activities provided there is
not some other conduct on the part of the employee that is injurious
to the employer's business. Additionally, the well-established
categories of improper employee conduct resulting in a breach of
fiduciary duty were implicitly affirmed by the court in Maryland
Metals. 94

91. Post-employment, noncompetition covenants should be distinguished from other
types of covenants not to compete, such as covenants incidental to the sale of a
business. See Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REV.
244, 256 (1928). The purpose of a post-employment restraint is to prevent
competitive use of information or relationships which pertain peculiarly to the
employer and which the employee acquired during the course of his employment,
whereas the objective of a covenant not to compete ancillary to the sale of a
business is to restrain the seller from recapturing and utilizing the good will of
the business which was transferred. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to
Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 647 (1960). Courts generally have displayed a
stricter attitude toward post-employment covenants than restrictive covenants
incidental to the sale of a business due to "powerful considerations of public
policy which militate against s~ctioning the loss of a man's liveihood." See,
e.g., Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 271, 196 N.E.2d 245, 247
(1963). Thus, post-employment covenants, which an employee agrees to as a
condition of employment, are subject not only to the reasonableness test
applicable to other types of covenants not to compete, but are enforceable only to
the extent necessary to protect the employer against the use of trade secrets,
customer lists, and similar confidential information that the employee has
obtained as a result of his employment. [d. See generally Kreider, Trends in the
Enforcement of Restrictive Employment Contracts, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 16 (1966).
92. While the topic of post-employment, noncom petition covenants is beyond the
scope of this casenote, certain generalizations regarding judicial analysis of
restrictive covenants can be noted as they are well-established. First, the scope of
e·ach covenant will be analyzed on a case by case basis. E.g., Becker v. Bailey
268 Md. 93, 299 A2d 835 (1973). Second, a covenant must be reasonable as to
duration, area and scope of activities. E.g., Ruhl v. F.A Bartlett Tree Expert Co.,
245 Md. 118, 225 A2d 288 (1967); see also Annot., 41 AL.R.2d 15(1955) (duration
of restriction); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94 (1955) (geographical restriction). Third,
reasonableness of the covenant requires that the restraint be no greater than
necessary to protect an employer's interests, the covenant is not unduly harsh
and oppressive on the employee, and th!it the covenant is not injurious to the
public. E.g., Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105
N.E.2d 685, 691-692 (Ct. C.P., Cuyahoga City 1952); see also Note, Validity p.nd
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants Not to Compete, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 161,
169 (1964).
The existence of a post-employment noncompetition covenant in Maryland
Metals might have been struck down by the court as an unreasonable restraint
on the employees' employment freedom and economic mobility.
93. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
94 282 Md. 31, 40-41, 382 A2d 564, 569-70 (1978). See note 38 supra.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In reaching its decision in Maryland Metals, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has extended the swing of the legal pendulum,
which recently has favored individual rights over business rights,
into the field of employment disputes. The law has taken a dramatic
shift in favor of individuals in areas such as landlord-tenant law,95
contract disputes,96 strict and products liability,97 and now employ-

95. For an excellent discussion of the shift in focus in the landlord-tenant
relationship away from feudal property concepts to the modern apartment lease
relationship and the public policy reasons for the shift, see Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See also
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 8-211 (Supp. 1978). Maryland has not yet
recognized an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases, but § 8-211
which deals with a landlord's duty to provide habitable premises, includes a rent
escrow provision. If "the landlord has failed to cure defects after notice and
opportunity to cure, the tenant may bring a rent escrow action" under the
statute. Davison, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and Its
Potential Effects Upon Maryland Landlord-Tenant Law, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 247,
257 (1976).
96. The emerging law on unconscionable contracts has been applied in numerous
contractual transactions cases. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (monthly installment payments on a rotating credit
system); Abbott v. Abbott, 188 Neb. 61, 195 N.W.2d 204 (1972) (settlement of a
will contest); American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964) (home improvement contracts); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing
Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972) (apartment lease).
Section 2-302 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE provision on
unconscionability reads as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder
of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Maryland adopted the above U.C.C. provision verbatim in ch. 538, 1963 Md.
Laws 802. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §2-302 (1975). For an interesting extension of
the concept into the law on damages, see McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md.
App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975) (tire "warranty" limiting damages to replacement
of tire only held unconscionable).
97. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), noted in, 6
U. BALT. L. REV. 295 (1977). The Court of Appeals of Maryland joined the vast
majority of jurisdictions and adopted a standard of products liability in tort
stated in Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). The court
stated that one justification for imposing a strict liability on manufacturers for
defective products is "because it shifts the risk of loss to those better able
financially to bear the loss." 278 Md. at 343, 363 A.2d at 958. See generally
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288,336 A.2d 118 (1975); Giant Food,
Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Moran
v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v.
Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). See also Digges, Product Liability in
Maryland Revisited, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1977); Product Liability Law
Symposium, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 1-151 (1975).
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ment disputes. 98 Maryland Metals indicates that an employee's
interest in his own economic welfare will be deemed superior to his
employer's business interests absent a showing that the employee
has committed an injurious act accompanying his change to new
employment. 99

Charles P. Bauer
J. Michael Dougherty, Jr.

98. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978).
99. Id. Accord, Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1968).
In Franzen the California Court of Appeal observed that:
[The courts should not be concerned] solely with the interests of the
competing employers, but also with the employee's interests. The
interests of the employee in his own mobility and betterment are deemed
paramount to the competitive business interests of the employers, where
neither the employee nor his new employer has committed any illegal act
accompanying the employment change.
Id. at 255, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 26.

